

~~Draft~~

January 23, 1987

Memo on meeting with Y. Velikov. (^hVice Pres. USSR Acad Sci').

I was called today, Friday, January 23, 1987, to a luncheon meeting which Ambassador Dubynin had requested of David Rockefeller in New York. With Mr. Rockefeller and Velikov were also Bill Hyland of the Council on Foreign Relations, J. J. Stremlau recently of The Rockefeller Foundation and now on Mr. Rockefeller's staff of the Pocantico Institute, another member of DR's staff ^(Chris Kennan?) and myself. We met at the Sea Grill for little over an hour.

Velikov's principal mission seems to be to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a new international foundation which he calls World Laboratory. This would attempt to sponsor a number of projects that would foster US/Soviet scientific and technical cooperation stressing those areas that, as he said, did not necessitate crossing the boundary where there were problems of political controversy, technology transfer or national security. I did not get a clear picture of ^{the projects} ~~what~~ he had in mind but one of them had to do with teaching children with the help of computers, another on satellite communications on behalf of health services throughout the world, another the *Phobos* orbiter and laser *surface* sampling experiment that Sagdeev has been already proposing. Velikov posed the NRDC monitoring initiative at *Semipalatinsk* as an example of what could be accomplished by private initiatives. I taxed him that as the representative of the world's ^{greatest} ~~largest~~ socialist country

that he seemed to be eager to privatise ^{foreign} ~~our~~ relations. His response was a chuckle but he said in effect "what works, works."

He indicated that one area that might be of joint interest, and that he had discussed with Sam Thier at the ^{NAS} Institute of Medicine, would be collaboration on AIDS with some side reference to vaccines. I told him that one serious obstacle to that was the propaganda campaign that had been exercised in the Soviet Union, accusing the United States of having invented AIDS as a BW agent. He said that was most unfortunate, that this is what happens sometimes in the popular press. He made the further argument: ~~and said~~ "if we gave our press more freedom we would have still more trouble, with an obvious illusion to ^{anti-Soviet slanders} ~~circumstances~~ in the US press." ^{HP} In a rather free ranging discussion of topics connected with arms control I can clearly recall and select just one incident. Velikov had been at Reykjavik, so I made a point of remarking that I was convinced that the President stood very strongly behind the proposals that had been tabled there, that he was disappointed at the obstacles ^{to} ~~there~~ consummation; but that ^{furthermore} that it was very obvious from the public press that he had very little support either among US allies or within his own administration for deep cuts. I said that I felt that the President nevertheless had a strong personal commitment to those objectives and had insisted on there being continued study of a variety of ramifications of the Reykjavik proposal. Despite the fact that ~~both~~ elements both in his administration and outside had been very critical of him, I indicated that it was important for the

Soviets to understand the very difficult personal political position the President was in at the present time, that ⁱⁿ the immediate circumstances he was almost paralyzed, and that I hope that the Russian side could be patient given that understanding. Velikov said they understood that very well, that they had not given up hope and that they would continue to press constructive proposals at whatever time seemed to be propitious. I indicated that there was one concrete step that would have very large symbolic importance as a ~~xxxxxx~~ earnest of Russian intentions in this area; ~~and I said~~ that would be the removal of decryption on their telemetry in missile testing. "His response was, 'well, do you really think that's very important?' I said he obviously thoroughly grasped what I was driving at, that, ^{ts} symbolic importance was much greater than its [#] technical one (in terms of the impediment that it offered to verification) but that one should not ~~xxxxxxx~~ underestimate the symbolic importance that was attached ~~to~~ this Soviet denial of information pertinent to the verification of their tests. He replied that this was something that they had given some thought to, but that he would take the emphasis in my remarks under further advisement.

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The main mission once again was the World Laboratory Foundation. The other guests seemed to be impressed that this was a matter worthy of further discussion although obviously would have to be looked at very critically in terms of the details of its management and administration. I asked Velikov whether he would be taking any further part in the CISAC committee meetings and he said in Moscow, "yes but he would not be able to do so in Washington."

It observed that I did not want to determine that